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Abstract 
This paper provides a brief comparison between the Employment Contracts Act 1991 (ECA) and the Swedish equivalent. 
the eo-Determination Act. The eo-Determination Act is then used to provide a framework against which an alternative 
to the ECA is discussed. The paper concludes by arguing for a system of contracting which emphasises collective 
bargaining, noting a number of impediments to its effective operation in New Zealand- at least in the short-term. Two 
such impediments which are discussed are the current low level of union density and voluntary unionism. Additionally, 
if New Zealand is to ratify lW conventions 87 and 98, collective good faith bargaining will have to be embodied in any 
new legislative framework. Recommendations for such a framework are made herein. 
In Sweden in the 1970s there was much discussion of 
employee participation in decision-making at the 
workplace. Three fonns of participation were discussed: 
financial, company and shop floor. This debate, accompa-
nied by a range of changes, aimed primarily at improving 
the individual's influence over their place of work, led to 
the enactment in 1976 of the Act of Employee Participa-
tion in Decision-Making (or the eo-Determination at 
Work Act). The Act took effect on January 1, 1977. As 
well as establishing the laws governing the powers of eo-
determination for employees, this Act also regulates issues 
such as mediation and conciliation in industrial disputes 
and the rights of association and negotiation. 
The system of industrial relations in Sweden has, for 
decades, been based primarily upon a system of negotiated 
contracts between employer and employee organisations. 
The shift from self-regulation to legislation did not negate 
this. The CO..Detennination Act (C-D Act) provides a 
general statutory framework for conducting the negotia-
tion of collective employment contracts. In this sense the 
C-D Act is consistent with the bipartite framework which 
preceded it This is the main industrial relations statute in 
force in Sweden at present. 
In New Zealand it took sustained pressure from organisa-
tions such as the Treasury, the New Zealand Employers' 
Federation and the New Zealand Business Roundtable, as 
well as the election of a National Government in 1990, 
before the ECA came into full effect The prime aim of this 
new industrial relations framework is to create an 'effi-
cient labom market'. 
The following discussion covers some key aspects of the 
Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 1994 
C-D Act comparing and contrasting them with the ECA, 
commencing with a brief discussion of eo-determination. 
eo-determination 
Dissatisfaction with employer activities in bringing about 
changes in the workplace underpinned the eo-determina-
tion clause within the C-D Act Swedish employers strongly 
resisted eo-determination and this aspect of the C-D Act 
came in for the most discussion. Yet, as with other matters 
between employee and employer. the C-D Act does not 
state that eo-determination clauses must be included in 
agreements but simply allows for negotiations on such 
matters and their inclusion in agnxments. The C-D Act 
states that 
Between parties who conclude a collective agreement 
on wages and general conditions of employment there 
should, if the employee party so requests. also be con-
cluded a collective ag.teement on a right of eo-determi-
nation for the employees in matters which concern the 
conclusion and termination of contracts of employment, 
the management and distribution of the work, and the 
activities of the business in other respects (s 32). 
The C-D Act therefore encourages discussions on matters 
which will enhance employee participation in the deci-
sion-making processes of finns. The ECA has no equiva-
lent provisions. 
Freedom of association and the right of 
association 
The section covering freedom of association within the 
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ECA reinforces the freedom to disassociate rather than 
associate. It does not actively encourage people to join 
unions to bargain collectively but simply reinforces the 
removal of actual or perceived constraints upon the indi-
vidual' s choice of bargaining agent and membership of a 
union. Nevertheless, discrimination on the basis of union 
or non-union membership is illegal and the legislation, 
according to Geare (1991: 5), will arguably be "as harsh on 
an employer who discourages union membership as on 
workers or officials who encourage it" (emphasis in origi-
nal). However, if employers are unsympathetic towards 
unions, they may well bring subtle, but effective pressure 
not to join (for example, refer to Cases Cited: Eketone v 
Alliance Textiles (NZ) Ltd [1993] 2 ERNZ 783). Recent 
research indicates that there has been a substantial shift 
from collective to individual contracts as a result of the 
ECA (Harbridge, 1993a and 1993b; DoL 1992 and 1993). 
Further, the New Zealand House of Representatives 
(NZHR. 1993: 10. Emphasis added) states that: 
The committee notes that care is needed to ensure that 
employees' rights under this section [freedom of asso-
ciation] are not effectively eroded, and that employers' 
should respect the intention of the Act The convnittee 
recommends that the Government keep this issue under 
active review. 
Under the C-D Act (s 7), the rights of employees and 
employers to belong to and work for appropriate organisa-
tions 1 representing their interests (the right of association) 
is guaranteed. The right to join such organisations is 
considered ' inviolate' (s 8). If violation of this right occurs 
via a provision in a collective agreement (or some other 
contract), or a legal action (the termination of a contract, 
for example), the contractual provision or the legal act will 
be considered void. Additionally, where a member of an 
employees or employers organisation violates this right, 
the C-D Act requires the relevant organisations to enforce 
this right 
This is quite different from the freedom of association 
clause in the ECA which leaves each individual to enforce 
their right to join a union style organisation and effectively 
discourages such membership. Collective contracts. multi-
employer contracts and union coverage in the workforce 
have all declined since the inception of the ECA This all 
undermines the ability of the individual to enforce their 
rights. Because of the relatively strong unions in Sweden 
the power of various organi.sations to ens me the member-
ship rights of workers clearly still exists. In New Zealand, 
however, the reduction of union influence has seen this 
power curtailed. 
Bargaining and the right to negotiation 
The ECA requires that when a bargaining agent is used, the 
bargaining agent obtains confmnation of their right to 
represent a given employee, employees or employer in the 
negotiation process. Once authorisation has been estab-
lished, the appropriate bargaining agent must recognise 
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that authority. However, they are not compelled to enter 
into negotiations, to reach an ag~eement or bargain in good 
faith. W alsh ( 1992: 65) states that: 
Employers can also decline to negotiate with certain 
agents. It remains a curious anomaly in the Act that, 
although it goes to remarkable lengths to ensure that 
bargaining agents are properly authorised and account-
able to their constituents, there is no guarantee that the 
other party will in fact bargain with the duly authorised 
agent 
Case law indicates that while an employer may choose not 
to negotiate, appropriately authorised bargaining agent(s) 
cannot be ignored, if an employer wishes to negotiate 
(Cases Cited: Eketone v Alliance Textiles (NZ) Ltd [ 1993] 
2 ERNZ 783). Further, Service Workers Union v Southern 
Pacific Hotel Corporation (NZ) Ltd [ 1993] 2 ERNZ 513 at 
p 515 (Italics in original; Emphasis added), held that 
The Alliance Texti/escasemadeitplain that recognition 
of the representative must take the form of negotiating 
with the representative if that is the employee's wish. 
Mineworkers Union of New Zealand v Dunollie Coal 
Mine Ltd [1994] 1 ERNZ 78, reinforces the above. This 
would allay the fear expressed by the ao (1994, para-
graph 741 (c)), in their interim report, that New Zealand 
case law was accepting of employers bypassing the appro-
priately authorised representative and going directly to the 
individual employee. 
Under the C-D Act employees and employers are both 
obliged to negotiate. They are required to follow certain 
advisory procedures for announcing their desire to nego-
tiate and once negotiations are entered into, to conduct and 
conclude these negotiations as speedily as possible. 
The C-D Act ensures that good faith bargaining takes 
place, as best as it can, by specifying that 'reasoned 
proposals' (s 15) be put forward for the solution of issues 
where necessary. It further enforces such bargaining by 
granting unions the right of access to company information 
'to the extent that the union needs in order to take care of 
its members' common interests in relation to the em-
ployer' (s 19). Employers are legally obliged to provide 
this information once it has been requested. 
It is interesting to note that in the first instance the confi-
dentiality of any information that is requested is subject to 
negotiation between the parties concerned. Once an agree-
ment has been reached regarding the confidentiality of 
requested information, those who receive it are governed 
by this agreement. If an agreement is not reached the courts 
may be called upon to guarantee the confidentiality of the 
information that has been requested. 
These types of provisions simply do not exist within the 
ECA Employers are not obliged to 'negotiate' with em-
ployees and good faith bargaining is not provided for. 
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Unions (or othez employee <qanisations) are not guaran-
teed access to company records. This places employee 
organisations in the New Zealand context in a much 
weaker bargaining position than their Swedish counter-
parts. 
Multi-employer agreements 
Section 18(2) of the Employment Contracts Act states that: 
Nothing within this Act requires any employer to be-
come involved in any negotiations for a collective em-
ployment contract to which it is proposed that any other 
employer be a party. 
This section further undermines the principle of collective 
bargaining. Although it does not make multi-employer 
agreements and industry wide bargaining illegal, or im-
possible, they are greatly impeded. High Wlemployment; 
the relative weakness of employees; the move against 
collective agreements and awards; the logistics of reach-
ing such agreements and other provisions of the Act (the 
illegality of strikeactivity supporting multi-employer agree-
ments), means that the union movement will find it " im-
possible to approach that level of coverage .. (W alsh, 1992: 
68) enjoyed under the LRA and that settlements akin to the 
award system are effectively precluded. 
Hamridge and Hince (1994) estimate that since May 1991 
union density in New Zealand has declined from about 52-
63 percent to 43-34 percent. depending on the particular 
measure used Recent research indicates a substantial drop 
in multi-employer ag~eements. BeamnontandJolly ( 1993: 
31) state that awards in 1989f)O, 'accounted for93 percent 
of private sector workers on collective settlements •. The 
Employee Survey Results in DoL (1993) indicate that 
across all sectors, multi-employer agreements account for 
17 percent of contracts, as at September 1993. Addition-
ally, Harbridge (1993a and 1993b) indicates that enter-
prise bargaining is now the norm; that 45 percent of 
workers p:eviously covered by a collective settlement 
have lost that coverage; and that over 80 percent of those 
collective contracts that have been negotiated were done 
so under the auspices of unions. DoL (1993) research 
reinforces Harbridge 's estimates of union coverage amongst 
those on collective contracts. 
Unlike the ECA, which emphasises individual contracts, 
the C-D Act emphasises collective ag~eements with union 
organisations the only ones able to negotiate such con-
tracts. Multi-employer agreements dominate in Sweden. 
Although some decentralisation of negotiations has taken 
place, as from 1993 contract negotiations have been con-
ducted entirely at industry level between national trade 
unions and employeers' associations (Bratt. 1994). 
Strikes and lockouts (peace obligations) 
Generally, strikes and lockouts are considered legal, under 
the ECA, only when they relate to the 'negotiation of a 
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collective employment contract' (s 60(d-ii) and s 64(b)). 
Case law makes it clear that it is sufficient for the lockout 
or strike activity to 'relate to • the negotiation of a collective 
employment contract for it to be legal (for example see 
Cases Cited: Hawtin v Skellerup Industrial Ltd [1992] 2 
ERNZ 500). Further, strikes (and lockouts) relating to 
individual employment contracts are essentially illegal 
under this framework (see Butterworths of New Zealand, 
1993). This clearly has limiting implictaions for the rate of 
strike activity. 
Sections 4145 of the C-D Act establish criteria for deter-
mining the legality (or illegality) of strikes, lockouts and 
other similar industrial activity. Such activity is deemed 
illegal if: 
( 1) it has not been sanctioned by the organisation to which 
the employee or employer belongs; 
(2) it is in breach of a peace obligation in a collective 
contract; or 
(3) the goal of such action is: 
(a) to bring pressure to bear in a dispute over the validity 
of a collective agxeement, its existence, its correct 
meaning, or in a dispute questioning whether a particu-
lar procedure goes against the agreement or the Act; 
(b) to effect a change of the agreement; 
(c) to facilitate a provision which will come into effect 
when the agreement has ceased to apply; or 
(d) to support another party who is not allowed to take 
industrial action. 
Before such action can be taken specific procedures (de-
tailed in this section of the C-D Act) must be followed. 
The general introduction to this section of the C-D Act 
indicates that industrial activity on multi-employer agree-
ments and economic and social policy issues, which affect 
the interests of workers is permitted. All that is required is 
for the employees' or employers • organisation to sanction 
such activity in accordance with their rules, and in a 
manner that is also consistent with current collective 
agreements (and the C-D Act). The appropriate activity 
can then proceed. These provisions are far more permis-
sive than the equivalent sections of the ECA. As indicated 
earlier, the ECA generally makes striking legal only when 
it relates to the negotiation of a new collective contract To 
strike for a multi-employer agreement is, however, illegal 
under the ECA. 
Part of the success of the ECA in ' improving industrial 
relations' by reducing strike activity is through severely 
restricting the grounds for lawful strikes. Similarly. it can 
be argued that high unemployment has a coercive effect, 
strongly discouraging employees from taking such indus-
trial action. 
It is worth highlighting here that an objective of both 
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systems is the resolution of disputes and thereby the 
maintenance of industrial peace. Each system, however, 
relies upon different means to achieve this goal. The ECA 
relies on an individualistic ethic in combination with high 
unemployment (and thus a relatively weak employee po-
sition). The C-D Act on the other hand relies on collective 
action; a balance of power between employees and em-
ployers; and the reaching of negotiated agteements in the 
truest manner possible. 
There is nothing inherent within the ECA which encour-
ages industrial harmony. From this it would seem that New 
Zealand's record of industrial harmony, could well be 
challenged in future should the employment situation alter 
to favour employees. Strike activity and job turnover may 
well increase as they are the two most likely means by 
which employees can improve their work environment, 
especially in the absence of good faith bargaining. 
Priority of interpretation 
Sections 33-37 of the C-D Act specify who is given 
priority in the intetptetation of an agreement or legislation 
should a dispute arise. This interpretation then holds until 
the dispute has been settled by the courts. The C-D Act 
generally gives the employee party priority of interpreta-
tion. However, if urgency precludes it, or the employee 
party's intetpretation is incorrect 'and that party realises or 
ought to have realised this' (s 33), the employer does not 
have to abide by the provisions of the C-D Act specifying 
employee priority. 
Further, the C-D Act states that 
Where, in the opinion of the employer, there exist urgent 
reasons against a postponement of the disputed work, he 
[she] may, ... require that the work be perfonned accord-
ing to his [her] interpretation in the dispute. The em-
ployee shall then be bound to perfonn the work_ Such a 
duty will not ... exist if the employer's interpretation in 
the dispute is incorrect and he [she] realises or ought to 
have realised this, or if the work involves danger to life 
or health, or if there exist comparable obstacles. 
If work is done ... the employer must immffiiately call 
for negotiations concerning the dispute. If the dispute 
cannot be settled by negotiation, he [she] is to file 
proceedings with a court. (s 34) 
These types of provisions do not exist in the ECA. The 
resolution of disputes are left in the hands of the individual 
parties to a contract Any further action to resolve them is 
then through the courts. 
Arguably, high unemployment (and the associated em-
ployment uncertainty) reinforces the power bias within the 
ECA, in which the employer generally holds greater bar-
gaining power. and assists, though indirectly. in dispute 
resolution and the lower incidence of industrial action. In 
any complaints driven process an individual who does not 
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have the necessary ski Us or resources to pursue a grievance 
is unlikely to obtain satisfaction. This situation seems 
unlikely to occur in Sweden because of the dominance of 
collective agteements. 
Right of veto 
This section of the C-D Act requires employers to initiate 
negotiations with the appropriate employeeorganisation(s) 
before engaging a sub-contractor to perfonn specified 
work for them. If, as with other sections of the C-D Act, 
urgency requires immHiiate action on behalf of the em-
ployer, they may engage the sub-contractor before meet-
ing their duty to negotiate. 
The most interesting aspect of this section is that if by 
engaging a sub-contractor the organisation of employees 
considers that a law, an existing agreement, or some other 
already existing arrangement between the employer and 
the organisation of employees, is likely to be disregarded. 
the organisation of employees may veto the employers' 
decision to engage the sub-contractor. 
There is no such right embodied in the ECA. The indi-
vidual nature of the ECA places a different intetpretation 
on the relationship between employee and employer. The 
protection of a person's rights are not the responsibility of 
the collective but the individual. The ECA does not pro-
hibit action by an employer which will lead to differential 
conditions of employment within the workplace for people 
doing the same type of work.. In fact, it facilitates such 
differentiation. 
Summary 
The C-D Act contains provisions which are variously 
similar to and quite different from the ECA. It is similar in 
that it facilitates a contract based system of employment 
agreements. It differs from the ECA in that it emphasises 
collective agreements. 
Unlike the ECA, the C-D Act recognises and encourages 
unions. It gives primacy to collective interests while still 
enabling, within a negotiated framew~ individual inter-
ests to be addressed. The overall balance of power within 
the C-D Act favours employees. Yet there are many 
counter clauses empowering employers. The ECA, on the 
other hand, effectively favours employers without provid-
ing any real counter balances to the power conferred upon 
them, except that which is available via the Employment 
Tribunal and Employment Comt. There is a much greater 
balance of power within the C-D Act than that which exists 
under the ECA. 
Under the ECA many workers are confronted with a 'take 
it or leave it' approach by their employer. Thus, for many 
within the workforce collective bargaining is the only way 
in which they can hope to obtain a degree of equity in a 
rapidly changing worlcplace. The framewotk provided by 
theC-D Act suggests some alternatives that may be adopted 
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by New Zealand policy makers. However, a number of 
limitations apply. Three key limitations are pertinent to the 
New Zealand environment, which restrict any possible 
policy prescriptions. 
Firstly. the dominant view of industrial relations, at present, 
accepts the need for a more flexible, contracts style frame-
work(seeforexample,NewZealandNationalParty,1993; 
Anderson and Walsh, 1993; Boxall, 1993; Foulkes, 1993; 
ILO, 1994; Anderson, 1994). 
Secondly, a voluntary approach to unionisation in New 
Zealand is also accepted. 
Thirdly, while it is clearly possible to ignore International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions (e.g. 87 and 98), 
such an approach seems inappropriate. 
Given these constraints, I would like to make specific 
recommendations. 
Recommendations 
The basis for these recommendations flows directly from 
the C-D Act However, before discussing the alternative, 
it should be noted that there are two key differences 
between the C-D Act and the recommendations that fol-
low. First, the recommendations made here allude to the 
need to allow for individual bargaining within the New 
Zealand context; the C-D Act makes no mention of it. 
Secondly, the right to veto has not been included, as it 
would appear to be unacceptable within the current New 
Zealand policy-making framewmk, particularly to em-
ployers, the National Government and, given Labour's 
proposals (New Zealand Labour Party, 1993), to them as 
well. Further proposals such as priority of interpretation 
and co-determinatio~ which have been included below, 
are likely to be strongly opposed 
Freedom of association 
The freedom of association clauses in any new legislative 
framework should incorporate an emphasis on collective 
bargaining. Further, they should be written in such a 
manner as to encourage (voluntary) union membership, 
rather than discourage it as it does at present. In this way 
such clauses would facilitate the ratification of ILO Con-
ventions F:7 and 98. 
Here the appropriate ll..O Conventions could act as guide-
lines to any new framework, as could the appropriate 
section in the C-D Act Further, the criticisms of the ILO 
( 1994), in their interim report, should also be taken account 
of in any new framework that may be developed. 
Finally, it should be noted that the New Zealand Employ-
ers' Federation argued that case law indicates that freedom 
of association with the ECA is in fact consistent with the 
appropriate ILO Conventions (see Hill, 1994, for exam-
ple). However, the interim ILO report (ILO, 1994, para-
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graph 741 (f)) would appear to contradict this view. 
illtimately. the follow-up mission by the n..o will clarify 
this issue further. 
Status of unions 
H New Zealand is to ratify ILO Conventions 87 and 98, 
unions should be clearly recognised within any new legis-
lative framework. To this end the wording of any new 
legislative framework should make it clear that the em-
ployees' organisations refe:t 1ed to are organisations formed 
by workers to rep1esent their interests (that is, trade un-
ions). Additionally, employers' organisations, of a similar 
nature, should be given equal weighting within any new 
legislative framework. Further, strike (and lockout) activ-
ity covering multi -employer agreements should be permit-
ted under any new framework, as should such activity 
covering economic and social policy issues affecting wolker 
interests. The C-D Act, the appropriate n..o Conventions 
as well as the interim criticisms of ILO (1994), may act as 
a guide for any replacement statute. 
In addition to this, and given ll..,Q Conventions 87 and 98, 
any new statute should, through its wording, emphasise the 
negotiation of collective agreements through organisa-
tions established by workers to represent their interests 
(that is, trade unions). It would seem that this is unlikely to 
have a dramatic impact on alternative bargaining agents at 
present Ninety percent of public sector employees and 
sixty seven percent of private sector employees on collec-
tive employment contracts utilised unions as their bargain-
ing agents, according to DoL (1993). Interestingly, DoL 
(i993) indicates that in 1992-1993 there was an increase in 
trade union representation in collective employment con-
tract negotiations over the level in 1991-1992. 
Bargaining stance 
Any new framework should facilitate genuine bargaining 
between parties, as much as is possible. Further, given ILO 
Convention 98, a ·hands-off approach by the relevant 
legal institutions does not seem adequate. if we are to ratify 
this Convention (see ILO (1994. paragraph 741 (f)). The 
Tribunal and the Court should therefore be interested in the 
stance taken by employers. particularly if a ' takeitorleave 
it' approach has been taken. since such an attitude would 
seem to violate the spirit of the ECA. at the very least. 
Finally, the employer should not be able to refuse to 
negotiate with the bargaining agent of the employees 
choice - excepting appropriate provisions within any new 
framework to exclude those with criminal records from 
being bargaining agents. CUITent New Zealand case law 
' 
as indicated earlier, has reinforced this and would seem to 
allay the fear expressed in the interim report of the ILO 
(1994, paragraph 741 (c)). 
Further, all parties should be obliged by statute to negoti-
ate with the other party (or their representative) once a 
desire to negotiate has been indicated by one or other party. 
As indicated earlier, case law has reinforced the right of 
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employers not to negotiate, if they wish. This could be 
included within statute by adding a clause requiring nego-
tiations to take place once an interest in such is indicated. 
Further, ' reasoned proposals' should be required when 
bargaining. In addition to this, all employment contracts 
should be required, by law, to be in writing with every 
employee either having their own copy of the contract or, 
at 1~ easy access to a copy (without having to request a 
copy from the employer). 
It is hoped that these provisions will enhance the depee of 
good faith bargaining that takes place and reduce any 
uncertainty that some must face by not having a written 
contract easily available and having to request it from their 
employer. 
The appropriate section of the C-D Act could act as guide 
here. Finally, it is interesting to note that the proposals by 
Labour, in this ~are very similar to the equivalent 
provisions within the C-D Act (see Labour Party. 1993). 
Company information 
Those involved in the process of negotiating an employ-
ment contract should be able to obtain company infonna-
tion pertaining to those negotiations, upon request Again 
the provisions within the C-D Act could provide a guide-
line for New Zealand statute here. Interestingly, Labom 
also provides for this type of clause within its proposed 
framework (see Labour Party, 1993). 
It should be emphasised that any such infonnation pro-
vided by the employer should be governed by strict confi-
dentiality procedures. Within the New Zealand context, 
any provisions of this type would also have to take account 
of the implications of the Official Infonnation Act 1982, 
the Companies Act 1993 and the Privacy Act 1993. Nev-
ertheless, the inclusion of such provisions, under strict 
confidentiality requirements, would facilitate a more equal 
bargaining position, particularly where such negotiations 
are collective. 
Peace obligation , priority of interpretation and the right 
to strike 
Employment contracts, to assist their sanctity, should not 
be able to be unilaterally altered during their tenn. How-
ever, renegotiation (and associated industrial action), dm-
ing the term of a contract, should be pennitted, if: 
( 1) There is a clause within a contract pennitting its 
renegotiation at the request of one or other party; 
(2) When an employee (or employees) feel(s) that work is 
of such a hazardous nature as to endanger their health 
and or life and an employer still requires the work to 
be done; and 
(3) One or other party breaches the contract during its tenn. 
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Action to redress any wrongs dwing the term of a contract 
should in the first instance be through negotiation and if a 
settlement is not reached to the mutual satisfaction of both 
parties, action should be through the courts. 
Priority of intetpietation in these instances should favour 
employees, as, generally, the weakest party within the 
employee, employerrelationship. This inteipt etation should 
apply until the court has ruled on the dispute. The appto-
priate sections of the C-D Act could well act as guide f<X" 
New Zealand statute here. 
Finally, the right to strike should be extended with particu-
lar emphasis on reintroducing such activity for economic 
and social policy issues that affect workers as well as the 
negotiation of multi-employer apeements. Negotiations 
should be able to be initiated by either party and, as with 
other contract details, once initiated negotiation should be 
obligatory by statute. 
Key weaknesses and other contracts 
The prime weakness of the ECA framework, in terms of 
providing effective protection for workers, is the po<X' 
union density currently in existence in New ZeaJand, and 
the reliance upon voluntary unionism. However, if we are 
to ratify ll..O Conventions 87 and 98, it would seem that 
little else can be advocated in tenns of an alternative. 
While this proposed framework enhances the position of 
unions and workers, the futme of the union movement here 
will still depend upon how they approach their role, the 
strategies they pursue, and how well they meet the de· 
mands of their members in this new environment 
A framework such as this would most effectively protect 
employees, under a two- or three-tier union structme with 
high union density. However, with the emphasis on volun-
tary unionism, such a structure would seem to require 
development over time. In this context it should be noted 
that if employers fail to share productivity gains with 
employees, union membership may well be encouraged. 
Thus, by applying 'market power' to the labour market the 
ECA may, somewhat ironically, work against the inten-
tions of the most ardent free market advocates. 
Finally, while encouraging collective bargaining and un-
ion negotiated contracts. any new legislative framework, 
should provide for bargaining agents outside the union 
movement to facilitate the representation of those who 
bargain away from union representation on an individual 
basis. 
Efforts by opposition parties to introduce private mem-
bers' Bills, and the pressure from the n.o. would seem to 
indicate that the current industrial relations framework is 
unlikely to last much longer in its present form, particu-
larly once Mixed Member Proportional Representation 
(MMP) is fully operational. Further, Hill (1994) reports 
that in a strategic move designed to facilitate the survival 
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of the ECA undez MMP, the New Zealand Employezs' 
Fedezatioo has advised the Government to amend the 
Act2. 
As indicated earlier, a number of factors have limited the 
conclusions drawn here. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the 
framework ptesented here has sufficient inbuilt protec-
tions to ensure that even in New Zealand's present position 
worker rights will be guaranteed. Fwther, it is also hoped 
that by providing a framework such as this many who 
currently may be unable to avail themselves of the protec-
tions associated with union based collective bargaining 
will be able to do so. Additionally, it is hoped that by 
encouraging this type of framework a greater deg10e of 
social justice will be introduced into the New Zealand 
industrial relations system. Given the present hostility of 
many employezs to collective bargaining confrontation3 
may be necessary before many New Zealand employees 
will be able to avail themselves of these types of protec-
tions. Finally, it is hoped that the types of changes pro-
posed here will.tedless, as much as possible, the imbal-
ances of the present system. 
Future research 
While source work has been done, future research on 
alternatives to the ECA, and the appropriateness of various 
frameworks to New Zealand is needed, if an alternative is 
to be developed which will enable ratification of ILO 
conventions 87 and 98. 
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Notes 
1 It should be noted that the tenn 'organisation of employ-
ees' used in the C-D Act is quite different from the tenn 
'employees' organisation' which is used in the ECA- The 
fonner refers to trade union style organisations (s 6 of the 
C-D Act refers) whereas the latter refers to any organisa-
tion, including unions, which may legally represent em-
ployees in contract negotiations and dispute resolution (s 
2 of the ECA refers). 
2 Details of the specific amendments suggested were not 
provided in the article. 
3 The word confrontation is used here in its broadest sense 
to refer to any challenges which may occur to the ECA 
framework which result in changes to the operation of New 
Zealand· s industrial relations framework. 
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